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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2017, the United States was hit with one of the
worst hurricane seasons in its history. Three immense systems made
landfall, causing severe destruction and loss of life.1 While the efforts
to rebuild in Texas and Florida have been mostly successful, the im-
pact of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico has lingered for more than
two years now.2 With the territory’s electric grid taking ages to get
back online, and with thousands still needing clean water,3 the situ-
ation there has largely been forgotten amidst the furor of today’s
media. Congress’s response has also been quite limited, though the
President called the recovery efforts an “unsung success.”4
Such cognitive dissonance between the perception and actuality
of the circumstances in Puerto Rico displays the ignorance most
1. Angela Fritz, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria and Nate Were So Destructive,
Their Names Have Been Retired, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2018/04/12/hurricanes-harvey-irma
-maria-and-nate-were-so-destructive-their-names-have-been-retired [https://perma.cc
/W7CE-P3P8].
2. See FEMA, TWO YEARS LATER, HURRICANE HARVEY RECOVERY PICKS UP STEAM
(2019); FEMA, TWO YEARS OF PROGRESS AFTER HURRICANE IRMA (2019); Dánica Coto,
Puerto Rico Faces Slow Recovery 2 Years After Maria, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 20, 2019),
https://apnews.com/966a0ad2b5094233a99551843025111f [https://perma.cc/M2VV-XRXG].
3. See Coto, supra note 2; Emma Schwartz, Quick Facts: Hurricane Maria’s Effect
on Puerto Rico, MERCY CORPS (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/united
-states/hurricane-maria-puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/BSQ2-EALM].
4. Washington Post, Trump Calls Puerto Rico Response ‘An Incredible Unsung
Success,’ YOUTUBE (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dlWG9Yz97E8
[https://perma.cc/6NYX-CN53].
715
716 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:715
Americans have with regard to the island’s status as a territory and
the disenfranchisement of its people, themselves American citizens.
The President’s statements exacerbate Puerto Rico’s invisible na-
ture, and “the perception gap of the problem widens.”5 Through “con-
gressional indifference” and inaction, there does not seem to be a
viable path for Puerto Rico to gain some sense of autonomy and free
association.6 Due to the unclear nature of the relationship between
the United States and Puerto Rico, it becomes necessary to involve
the international community in order to restore equality and essen-
tial rights.
Now, more than two years after the fact, bureaucracy and cor-
ruption have further hindered any reconstruction efforts.7 Puerto
Ricans are left in limbo, fending for themselves with limited resources
in an effort to bring normalcy back to the island. Reconstruction is
barely moving, with government red tape and corruption derailing ef-
forts and keeping funds away from community rebuilding projects.8
This Note serves to critique the current treatment of Puerto
Rico and its people, and how Hurricane Maria has enhanced the
troubles to a breaking point. First, we will discuss the aftermath of
Puerto Rico, and the state of disrepair that remains more than a year
after the disaster. Then, we look at the symptoms and prior factors
that contributed to and exacerbated the crisis, mainly the inability
to authorize economic and infrastructure reform that stems from
Puerto Rico’s designation as a non-self-governing territory. With the
information that millions are fleeing Puerto Rico as a result, the focus
then shifts towards the inaction of the international community.
The solution presented here is to reclassify Puerto Rico under
the doctrine of the United Nations, and to treat the island as a quasi-
failed state. From this, the international community can take more
unilateral action to provide aid to Puerto Rico, and help transition
it to a fully self-governing body, either as an independent nation or
a state in the United States. Failure to do so would result in cata-
strophic consequences for the Puerto Rican people and for the nation
as a whole.
5. José Javier Colón Morera, Puerto Rico: A Case of American Imperial Doubts?, 85
REV. JUR. U. P.R. 883, 887 (2016).
6. Id. at 885.
7. Arelis R. Hernández, Puerto Ricans Still Waiting on Disaster Funds As Hurricane
Maria’s Aftermath, Earthquakes Continue to Affect Life on the Island, WASH. POST (Jan. 19,
2020, 9:40 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/puerto-ricans-still-waiting-on
-disaster-funds-as-hurricane-marias-aftermath-earthquakes-continue-to-af fect-life-on
-the-island/2020/01/19/3864fcea-387f-llea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html [https://perma
.cc/A4R3-SCNJ].
8. Id.
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I. THE AFTERMATH
On September 20, 2017, Hurricane Maria made landfall on
Vieques, Puerto Rico as a strong Category 4 hurricane, with maximum
sustained winds at 155 mph.9 The last time Puerto Rico had experi-
enced such a strong hurricane was in 1928, and then again in 1932,
so the amount of damage Hurricane Maria caused was completely
unexpected.10 The island’s communications structure was entirely
wiped out, with eighty-five percent of the cell towers being nonfunc-
tional in the immediate aftermath.11
Over a year later, the wreckage left after Hurricane Maria still
impacts daily life in Puerto Rico. The immediate effect from the hur-
ricane is apparent, but it is the long-term ramifications that really
underline the lasting damage such a disaster unleashes upon a com-
munity. The delayed federal response underscores an unconscious
prejudice that will be discussed later in this Note: that Puerto Ricans
are not real American citizens.12
In the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 2017
Hurricane Season After-Action Report, an entire section of its anal-
ysis was limited to the “exceptional circumstances” in Puerto Rico.13
Long-term infrastructure outages were severe and widespread on
the island, contrasting the isolated incidents of outages after the
mainland hurricanes.14
Establishing proper chain of communication was the most diffi-
cult. FEMA was unable to adapt to the quickly deteriorating condi-
tions fast enough to trigger an efficient response. “FEMA struggled
to overcome its reliance on commercial cellular and broadband
communications to execute program delivery and conduct command
and control activities. For example, limited cellular service impacted
the ability of disaster survivors to register for FEMA assistance.”15
9. Major Hurricane Maria—September 20, 2017, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., https://www
.weather.gov/sju/maria2017 [https://perma.cc/M63B-8PD5] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
10. The last Category 4 hurricane to hit the island was Hurricane San Felipe II. See
Hurricane Maria Slams Into Puerto Rico With Life-Threatening Winds Up to 155 Miles
Per Hour, TIME (Sept. 20, 2017), https://time.com/4949393/hurricane-maria-category-4
-puerto-rico-landfall [https://perma.cc/YTZ4-CYM2].
11. Robinson Meyer, What’s Happening With the Relief Effort in Puerto Rico?, THE AT-
LANTIC (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/10/what-happened
-in-puerto-rico-a-timeline-of-hurricane-maria/541956 [https://perma.cc/3Z2Q-MJWZ].
12. See infra Part II. See generally Hawa K. Allan, Paradoxes of Sovereignty and
Citizenship: Humanitarian Intervention at Home, 20 CUNY L. REV. 389, 391 (2017)
(“How does one reconcile the swift federal response to a ‘third world country’ abroad
relative to the ‘third world country’ at home?”).
13. FEMA, 2017 HURRICANE SEASON FEMA AFTER-ACTION REPORT 33 (2018)
[hereinafter FEMA REPORT].
14. Id.
15. Id. at 35.
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Its contingency communication options, through satellite, were
not properly configured and exceeded the pre-staged supply.16 Again,
“[p]rocurement and logistics challenges” delayed the delivery of
more devices, further limiting the extent to which FEMA could act.17
Logistical concerns and unpreparedness are similar excuses that
follows most disastrous events. Organizations specifically targeted
to this situation, like FEMA, should have trained personnel and
flexibility to adapt to these situations. Of course, this season was an
anomaly in terms of the large magnitude of each hurricane.18 How-
ever, this does not preclude them from liability in this situation. As
this Note mentions later, the limited aid FEMA provided may result
from the fact that Puerto Rico is ignored in the greater American
landscape; its status as a territory implies a lesser priority than
disasters in actual states.19
A telling discrepancy between the response to Maria and the
response to the mainland hurricanes was the time taken to imple-
ment adequate food and shelter operations. FEMA created the Shel-
tering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP) policy to support
displaced victims.20 Due to the lack of reconstruction resources, close
to 500 people remained in shelters for over three months—but that
was after a four-month delay in establishing shelter sites.21 The fact
that the STEP policy was created five years prior, during Hurricane
Sandy, yet still had significant setbacks is indicative of the lack of
preparation in Puerto Rico.22 This is a territory much more suscepti-
ble to natural disasters but is again forgotten. “State and local gov-
ernments implement STEP and therefore determine the program’s
administrative structure, which necessitates customization and can
impact implementation timelines,” but FEMA had yet to formulate
“standard national policies or training for the program.”23 This argu-
ment is explained further later in this Note, where Puerto Rico’s
inability to enact its own legislation affects the timeliness of any
assistance or recovery efforts.
FEMA looks at the logistical and organizational repercussions
from the hurricane, but fails to take the humanity into account. A par-
allel project, created through a collaboration between Quartz, the As-
sociated Press, and Puerto Rico’s Center for Investigative Journalism,
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Fritz, supra note 1.
19. See infra Part I.
20. FEMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 42.
21. Id. at 40, 43.
22. See id. at 42.
23. Id.
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seeks to amplify the voices of the victims of the hurricane.24 Their
report identified close to five hundred victims that passed in the
aftermath of Hurricane Maria, calling it a consequence of “govern-
ment inaction.”25 The project keeps count of all deaths and notable
events post-hurricane.26 It serves to highlight the discrepancy be-
tween the official record and the actual number of deaths reported
in the weeks directly after landfall.27
The White House continues to deny any report that inflates the
official death record. “[D]espite the widespread belief that the hurri-
cane only affected older people and those with preexisting conditions,”
the death rate of young people surpassed the elderly death rate.28
President Trump denounced any estimate as a left-wing conspiracy
to make his administration look bad, but the data is clear.29 “[B]e-
tween Sept. 6, 2017, and the day Trump left the island, there were
640 more deaths than the average during the same period in the last
three previous years.”30 A jump like this can only be explained by the
extenuating circumstances of the Hurricane, and its impact on the
already crumbling infrastructure of the island. Much like other in-
ternational conflicts, “[c]ertain groups of persons tend to be particu-
larly vulnerable . . . such as children, the elderly and the disabled.”31
There needs to be greater consideration for the “inter-locking
human-driven systems” that exacerbate such large-scale natural
events.32 “[W]hat makes [natural hazards] a disaster is how they in-
tersect with individual and community vulnerability, which is socially
constructed.”33 The lack of access to vital utilities, like electricity,
24. Youyou Zhou, The Story, HURRICANE MARIA’S DEAD, https://hurricanemariasdead
.com/index.html [https://perma.cc/HJV2-W4Q6] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
25. Id.
26. See generally id.
27. On October 3, two weeks after the hurricane hit, the official record had certified
only sixteen deaths, while the project identified 168 deaths. By August 28th, the Puerto
Rican government estimated that 2,975 people died as a result of Maria. The official
record remained at sixty-four deaths, which had not changed since the previous
December. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. President Trump was on the island for four hours on October 3. Zhou, supra note
24.
31. Sandesh Sivakumaran, Techniques in International Law-Making: Extrapolation,
Analogy, Form and the Emergence of an International Law of Disaster Relief, 28 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1097, 1116 (2017).
32. David M. Perry, How Neglect and Indifference Killed Puerto Ricans After Hurricane
Maria, PACIFIC STANDARD (Sept. 28, 2018), https://psmag.com/social-justice/neglect-and
-indifference-killed-puerto-ricans-after-hurricane-maria [https://perma.cc/8WSR-AYC3].
33. David M. Perry, ‘There Are No Natural Disasters’: A Conversation with Jacob
Remes, PACIFIC STANDARD (Oct. 4, 2017), https://psmag.com/economics/there-are-no
-natural-disasters [https://perma.cc/5U8R-UU7C].
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medical care, and communications directly led to over three hundred
deaths, according to the report;34 these casualties were completely
avoidable. Of course, it is almost impossible to find a concrete count
of the casualties in the aftermath. Studies can only estimate based on
mortality rates and trends, “comparing the estimated post-hurricane
death rate to the mortality rate for the year before.”35
FEMA blames its mismanagement on a lack of foresight regard-
ing the possibility of successive catastrophic hurricanes, but analy-
sis of the responses shows a different story.36 Simply, the federal
government was faster in providing aid to victims in Texas after
Hurricane Harvey than to Puerto Ricans after Hurricane Maria.37
Though the damage in Puerto Rico far exceeded that in Houston
after the hurricanes, the response in Texas was more efficient and
successful.38 More telling was the President’s public response to both
situations.39 President Trump traveled to Houston at least twice
during rebuilding efforts, but only made one highly publicized stop
in Puerto Rico, where he was criticized for his apparent lack of com-
passion for people’s struggles there.40 He marveled at the response
after Harvey, while bemoaning the lack of a “community effort” in the
aftermath of Maria.41 Meanwhile, there were 10,000 federal workers
on the island, compared to 30,000 on the ground in Houston.42 The
lack of attention given to Hurricane Maria is indicative of Puerto
34. See Zhou, supra note 24.
35. Arelis R. Hernández & Laurie McGinley, Harvard Study Estimates Thousands
Died in Puerto Rico Because of Hurricane Maria, WASH. POST (May 29, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/harvard-study-estimates-thousands-died-in-puerto
-rico-due-to-hurricane-maria/2018/05/29/1a82503a-6070-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story
.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.42f940308044 [https://perma.cc/PKV8-RGGG].
36. See FEMA REPORT, supra note 13, at ii.
37. Danny Vinik, How Trump Favored Texas Over Puerto Rico, POLITICO (Mar. 27,
2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/27/donald-trump-fema-hurricane-maria
-response-480557 [https://perma.cc/G2ZU-DXZW].
38. No two hurricanes are alike, and Harvey and Maria were vastly different
storms that struck areas with vastly different financial, geographic and
political situations.
But a comparison of government statistics relating to the two recovery ef-
forts strongly supports the views of disaster-recovery experts that FEMA
and the Trump administration exerted a faster, and initially greater, effort
in Texas, even though the damage in Puerto Rico exceeded that in Houston.
Id.
39. Id. (“If you look at his public messaging on a comparable timeline around Puerto
Rico, there’s virtually nothing . . . That sends a signal to the whole federal bureaucracy
about how they should prioritize.”)
40. Id. (“He made one visit. That type of executive attention drives the bureaucracy.
While there might be people working behind the scenes, not having that constant atten-
tion and trips to region does have an impact on the level of effort.”).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Rico’s diminished political voice.43 With only one non-voting member
in Congress, the territory does not have the resources to bat for itself
on the national stage.44
In total, $91 billion has been earmarked for recovery efforts in
Puerto Rico.45 $48 billion comes from emergency relief funds, while
Congress has appropriated the other $43 billion.46 However, only an
estimated $14 billion has actually made its way to the island, with
the rest tied up in bureaucratic battles between the Puerto Rican gov-
ernment and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).47 Negotiations about the estimates of various development
projects have been delayed,48 which are key in approving the dis-
bursement of the recovery funds. This new procedure is “[d]esigned
to promote more efficient project delivery, [as] it allows local govern-
ments to keep any surplus below the estimate and use it on another
site. But if the project comes in above budget, the government is
solely responsible for covering the overrun.”49
Because Puerto Rico has suffered through a financial crisis
however, its government does not have any funds to supplement any
over-budget projects.50 As such, HUD has purposely missed dead-
lines to release funds to Puerto Rico, citing the believed incompe-
tency of the territory’s housing department to effectively manage
the funds.51 The current administration has continued to bring up
43. See Vinik, supra note 37 (comparing the political response to the hurricanes,
where multiple Senators and Governors demanded greater resources for its citizens after
Harvey, showing a lack of Congressional attention to Puerto Rican victims).
44. See id.
45. Sharyl Attkisson, Where Did the $91 Billion for Hurricane Recovery in Puerto
Rico Go?, REAL CLEAR POL. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019
/10/07/sharyl_attkisson_where_did_the_91_billion_for_hurricane_recovery_in_puerto
_rico_go.html [https://perma.cc/8M6B-4AGM].
46. Id.
47. See id.; Jan Wesner Childs, HUD Officials Say They Purposely Withheld Puerto
Rico Hurricane Maria Recovery Money, WEATHER CHANNEL (Oct. 19, 2019, 10:24 AM),
https://weather.com/news/news/2019-10-19-puerto-rico-maria-hud-funding-withheld
[https://perma.cc/S29Q-FM7N].
48. See Mark Walker & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, FEMA’s Hurricane Aid to Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands Has Stalled, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/11/27/us/politics-fema-hurricane-aid-puerto-rico-virgin-islands.html [https://perma
.cc/3WKA-Y6Q5].
49. Ledyard King, 2 Years After Hurricanes, Trump Administration Has OK’d Only
9 Projects for Funding in Puerto Rico, USA TODAY (Jul. 23, 2019), https://www.usatoday
.com/story/news/politics/2019/07/18/trump-tweets-puerto-ricos-irma-maria-hurricane-re
covery-trickles/1758820001 [https://perma.cc/LK9H-6PNQ].
50. Nicole Acevedo, HUD Officials Knowingly Failed ‘to Comply With the Law,’
Stalled Puerto Rico Hurricane Relief Funds, NBC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.nbc
news.com/news/latino/hud-20%officials-knowingly-failed-comply-law-stalled-puerto-rico
-20%hurricane-n1068761?cid=sm_npd_nn_tw_ma [https://perma.cc/5D9A-U5WE].
51. See id.
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talking points of “ ‘alleged corruption’ and ‘fiscal irregularities’ as
well as ‘Puerto Rico’s capacity to manage these funds.’ ”52
It is argued that this blatant disregard of a Congressional man-
date is justified by the political unrest in the territory, but HUD offi-
cials have, however, testified that they had “no statutory authority”
to arbitrarily withhold the funds.53 Now, it seems that HUD will con-
tinue to delay releasing the funds until a financial oversight monitor
is appointed.54 There is not yet word on when, or if, that will occur.
Politics should be exclusive of human suffering. Two years down
the road from a major disaster, most Puerto Ricans are still being
treated as second-class citizens. With this hyper-political climate,
the perception of victory matters more than actual results and re-
sponsibility.
II. LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE FIGHT FOR AUTONOMY
The situation in Puerto Rico is untenable. With this extreme con-
fluence of events, Puerto Rico is on the brink of collapse. There does
not seem to be any significant recourse on its way either. Hurricane
Maria decimated the island’s infrastructure, its immense debt is
crushing the citizens, and Congress’s unwillingness to cooperate fur-
ther has led to a mass exodus.55 People are emigrating from Puerto
Rico in droves, resulting in a “forced exile,” with no real prospect of
returning to a stable life.56
Congress’s callous treatment of Puerto Rico and its hesitance to
grant any solid pathway towards autonomy and full citizenship is
the foundation for this crisis—a crumbling foundation. “The United
States cannot continue its state of denial by failing to accept that its
relationship with its citizens who reside in Puerto Rico is an egre-
gious violation of their civil rights.”57 Most noticeably is the depriva-
tion of life, liberty, and property granted under the Constitution.58
Juan Torruella, Judge for the First Circuit Court of Appeals, defines
the United States’ relationship with Puerto Rico an “experiment[ ]”
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.; see also Childs, supra note 47.
55. See Developments in the Law—The U.S. Territories, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1616, 1656
(2017) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; John D. Sutter, 130,000 Left Puerto Rico Af-
ter Hurricane Maria, Census Bureau Says, CNN (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018
/12/19/health/sutter-puerto-rico-census-update/index.html [https://perma.cc/D9LA-9UDN].
56. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1656.
57. Juan R. Torruella, U.S. Territories Commentary Series: Why Puerto Rico Does Not
Need Further Experimentation With Its Future: A Reply to the Notion of “Territorial
Federalism,” 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 65, 68 (2018).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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that has continued the inherent inequality of citizens residing on
the island.59
Congress granted Puerto Ricans full citizenship, with some im-
portant caveats.60 They cannot vote in presidential elections and
have no voting representation in Congress.61 The Territory Clause of
the Constitution grants Congress wide discretion to dictate the affairs
of Puerto Rico as it sees fit.62 This seems to directly contradict leg-
islation that designates Puerto Rico as a “State of the Union and
subject to the provisions. . . of the Constitution of the United States.”63
This status limbo has existed since the Court first decided on
Puerto Rican autonomy, after its acquisition, in 1901.64 When Spain
first handed the territory of Puerto Rico to the United States, there
was no clear language on political status, simply that its fate “shall be
determined by the [sic] Congress.”65 As noted, Congress continued to
waffle and shift Puerto Rican status to fit the whims of U.S. domestic
and foreign policy.66 Justice White noted as much in an Insular Case:
The result of what has been said is that whilst in an interna-
tional sense Porto Rico was not a foreign country, since it was
subject to the sovereignty of and was owned by the United States,
59. Torruella, supra note 57, at 66–67, 69.
60. See 48 U.S.C. § 737 (1917).
61. Lani E. Medina, An Unsatisfactory Case of Self-Determination: Resolving Puerto
Rico’s Political Status, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1048, 1050 (2010).
62. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
63. 48 U.S.C. § 737.
64. The Court decided six cases regarding the legal structures of Puerto Rico and its
relationship with the United States and reported the judgments simultaneously; this
series of decisions became known as the Insular Cases. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
1, 1–3 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221, 221–22 (1901); Dooley v. United
States, 182 U.S. 222, 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 243–44 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 244–45 (1901); Huus v. New York and Porto Rico Steam-
ship Company, 182 U.S. 392, 392, 396 (1901). Downes v. Bidwell was the case most scru-
tinized by succeeding courts, but importantly, it does not have a plurality opinion. See
Jesús G. Román, Comment, Does International Law Govern Puerto Rico’s November 1993
Plebiscite?, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 98, 103 n.39 (1995).
65. Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Paris), Spain-U.S., art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754,
1759; see Rafael Hernández Colón, The Evolution of Democratic Governance Under the
Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2017) (“The
nonincorporation doctrine gives Congress constitutional flexibility when governing non-
contiguous territories, and leaves the duration of territorial status indefinitely subject
to the autocratic plenary powers of Congress.”); Román, supra note 64, at 103.
66. See, e.g., Rafael A. Declet, The Mandate Under International Law for a Self-
Executing Plebiscite on Puerto Rico’s Political Status, and the Right of U.S.-Resident
Puerto Ricans to Participate, 28 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 19, 40–41 (2001) (calling
for a new plebiscite to include Puerto Ricans living outside of the island but still in U.S.
territory); Román, supra note 64, at 98, 101 (examining the reasoning behind the failed
legislation to approve Puerto Rico’s 1993 plebiscite that reiterated its citizens’ call for
greater autonomy).
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it was foreign to the United States in a domestic sense, because
the island had not been incorporated into the United States, but
was merely appurtenant thereto as a possession.67
Hedging political status on the needs of the mainland (and
Hawaii) ignores the needs of U.S. citizens simply because they do
not live in an actual state. Some scholars believe that the civil rights
of an individual citizen and nation-state are separate legal catego-
ries, and Puerto Rico does not fit into either.68 Instead, it can be
“categorically included or excluded from the structures and institu-
tions of the nation-state, depending upon the will of the political
majority.”69 Such a relationship was acceptable over a century ago,
but the clear standards of the international community, coupled
with the strong push for decolonization after World War II, make
clear that the continued allowance of Congressional flexibility is
akin to imperialism.70
Recently, the Supreme Court decided upon an aspect of Puerto
Rican sovereignty under the Double Jeopardy Clause in Puerto Rico
v. Sanchez Valle.71 In this case, the defendant was already convicted
under a federal arms–trafficking law, he sought to dismiss separate
claims brought under Puerto Rican law.72 He argued that Puerto Rico
is not separately sovereign from the United States under the Double
Jeopardy Clause, which bars prosecuting one person for the same
conduct under equivalent laws.73 Puerto Rico argued that as a terri-
tory, its sovereignty created an exception to double jeopardy under
the dual-sovereignty doctrine.74 The Court rejected this view, hold-
ing that Puerto Rico’s prosecutorial authority ultimately derived
from the Constitution and Congress, and thus the offenses were not
distinct to allow for separate federal and territorial prosecutions.75
67. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341–42 (1901).
68. See Rebecca Tsosie, The Politics of Inclusion: Indigenous Peoples and U.S. Citi-
zenship, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1692, 1750 (2016); Medina, supra note 61, at 1061–63.
69. Tsosie, supra note 68, at 1750.
70. See Colón, supra note 65, at 589 (comparing the relationship between the U.S.
and Puerto Rico to that of British colonies, such as Canada, Australia, and India) (citing
Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, Law Officer, Dep’t. of War, to Henry Stimson,
Sec’y. of War (Mar. 11, 1914)).
71. 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1867–68 (2016).
72. Id. at 1869.
73. Id. at 1867, 1869.
74. Id. at 1867, 1869–70. Dual-sovereignty carves an exception for criminal conduct
against two separate sovereigns, treating them as two distinct offenses. See Adam J.
Adler, Note, Dual Sovereignty, Due Process, and Duplicative Punishment: A New Solution
to an Old Problem, 124 YALE L.J. 448, 450 (2014) (citing Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82,
88 (1985)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
75. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1870, 1875–77.
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The Court’s deliberation analogized the original authority of
States and Native American tribes, which had established law before
entering into the Union.76 Thus, they can be considered separate
sovereigns. Meanwhile, Puerto Rico was initially a Spanish colony,
under Spanish sovereignty, before transferring to the U.S.77 While
Puerto Rico eventually created its own constitution and changed its
status to an unincorporated Commonwealth, the document’s power
still branched from Congressional authority and approval:
Congress conferred the authority to create the Puerto Rico Con-
stitution, which in turn confers the authority to bring criminal
charges. That makes Congress the original source of power for
Puerto Rico’s prosecutors—as it is for the Federal Government’s.
The island’s Constitution, significant though it is, does not break
the chain.78
This purely historical analysis completely bypasses the circum-
stances in which Puerto Rico initially became a Spanish colony,
ignoring the possibility of a sovereign society before Spanish oppres-
sion and the fact that it and the Federal Government do not share
the same source of power.79 Without this parallel sovereignty prior
to incorporation, “there is no getting away from the past.”80 The
Court pays no heed to how Puerto Rico functions, reasoning that “if
our double jeopardy decisions hinged on measuring an entity’s self-
governance, the emergence of the Commonwealth would have resulted
as well in the capacity to bring the kind of successive prosecutions
attempted here.”81
This Note argues that such an anachronistic view of territorial
independence ignores any progress Puerto Rico has made towards
full sovereignty in the interim.82 As Justice Breyer notes in his
dissent, Congress has an essential role in the creation of new states
or sovereigns, and thus the “source” of power eventually leads back
to the Constitution.83 Puerto Rico obviously has a unique cultural
tradition and history—it was not a land devoid of order before the
United States saved it.84
76. Id. at 1871–72.
77. Id. at 1868.
78. Id. at 1875–76.
79. Id. at 1878–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1876.
81. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1874.
82. See id. at 1880 (“[A]s with the Philippines, new States, and the Indian tribes—
congressional activity and other historic circumstances can combine to establish a new
source of power.”).
83. Id. at 1879.
84. Id. at 1884.
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Breyer uses the example of the Philippines, previously an Ameri-
can territory, as one where its independence and sovereignty are
absolute, even though the original source of that power comes from
Congressional action.85 Like the Philippines, Puerto Rico has always
operated as a distinct entity, and should enjoy the same consider-
ations of self-government as such.86 Of course, the Court attempts
to narrow its decision strictly to the double jeopardy issue, but it
seems easy to extend this rationale to all criminal proceedings in
the territory.87 As Colón notes:
These extrapolations delegitimize the people of Puerto Rico as
the creative source behind the Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and maintain that the island, in its internal affairs,
is still a territory subject to the plenary powers of Congress,
merely because the U.S. Supreme Court identifies Congress as
the ultimate source of power for purposes of double jeopardy.88
In the end, this is just another case of judicial confusion, where the
federal government intrudes upon Puerto Rico’s affairs only when
convenient.89 This haphazard governing continues to propagate
Puerto Rico’s already jumbled political status.90
While Puerto Rico suffers, it is up to the mainland population
to resolve the conflict and bring focus to the civil rights deprivation
going on. Yet many Americans do not even realize that Puerto Ricans
are American citizens, which creates a larger gap of understanding
between these groups.91 An inherent bias is formed. Since they are
not real Americans, they do not need to receive the same kind of
treatment that we mainland Americans have. The reluctance to admit
a “poor Spanish-speaking Latino state” relates to the perceived un-
American nature of having a state that does not primarily converse
in English.92 That furthers the depiction of Puerto Rico as a Caribbean
tourist destination, and not as an integral part of the American
community and culture.
85. Id. at 1878.
86. See id. at 1878, 1884.
87. Colón, supra note 65, at 599.
88. Id.
89. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1883 (“Finally, as to the Legislative Branch, to my
knowledge since 1950 Congress has never—I repeat, never—vetoed or modified a local
criminal law enacted in Puerto Rico.”) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1882–83; see Colón, supra note 65, at 598–99.
91. Kyle Dropp & Brendan Nyhan, Nearly Half of Americans Don’t Know Puerto
Ricans Are Fellow Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/09/26/upshot/nearly-half-of-americans-don’t-know-people-in-puerto-ricoans-are-fellow
-citizens.html [https://perma.cc/S2M9-UUJZ].
92. Morera, supra note 5, at 885.
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In fact, a reason why the response has not been as robust as ex-
pected is that “[m]any Americans don’t realize that what happened
in Puerto Rico is a domestic disaster, not a foreign one.”93 This in-
accurate belief can have disastrous consequences, especially with
the growth of nationalist ideology in recent years. Americans are less
likely to support foreign aid, but that would change if people actually
knew that Puerto Rico was part of the country.94 Public sympathy
is a powerful force, and studies consistently show that people are more
likely to contribute to members of their own group.95 “Why geo-
graphic location should make any difference or have any relevance
to a determination of such a fundamental question as the rights to
which a citizen is entitled defies any logic or valid legal principle”
and contradicts the Constitution’s intent.96
All of this supports the proposition that Puerto Ricans are dis-
criminated against and deprived of basic due process rights. By not
properly educating the public about Puerto Rico and its situation,
the government is better equipped to sweep Puerto Ricans’ plight
under the rug. In a callous and fleeting global conscience, it becomes
easy to move focus from a group of people that many would not realize
are citizens and towards the new national crisis without addressing
the previous one.
When Puerto Ricans themselves try to take charge of their own
destiny, even that has little influence on the legislature. Indeed,
Puerto Ricans have trended more towards the idea of statehood than
independence or the status quo.97 In 2011, a report by the President’s
Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status determined that Congress should
follow the will of the Puerto Rican people.98 “The policy of the Fed-
eral executive branch has long been that Puerto Rico’s status should
be decided by the people of Puerto Rico.”99 Mid-2017, the island held
a plebiscite ballot to determine how its people wanted to gain true
freedom.100 The results were overwhelmingly in favor of statehood,
93. Dropp & Nyhan, supra note 91; see also Allan, supra note 12, at 421 (“Further-
more, while it is unequivocal that the United States government has a responsibility to
protect its citizens, which would be presumably uncontroversial to fulfill, the responsibility
to do the same for noncitizens abroad is, by comparison, not only of dubious certainty,
but its assumption is often politically unpopular.”).
94. Dropp & Nyhan, supra note 91.
95. Id.
96. Torruella, supra note 57, at 97 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 96.
98. Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico and the Right of Accession, 43 YALE
J. INT’L L. 229, 231 (2018).
99. Id. (quoting REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS
18 (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/Puerto_Rico
_Task_Force_Report.pdf).
100. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44721, POLITICAL STATUS OF
PUERTO RICO: BRIEF BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FOR CONGRESS 10–12
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though only 23% of the population voted.101 Still, such a lopsided
declaration for change is met with little action.
In today’s hyper-partisan political climate, such an act may
signal a death knell to the Republican party. If President Obama’s
recommendation, and the Task Force’s idea of following the people,
were followed, Puerto Rico could significantly shift the balance of
power in both houses of Congress.102 Given its current state, its citi-
zens have reason to lean very liberal, with a strong focus on social
issues and the global economy.103 Congress is apprehensive about a
possible culture clash as a consequence of statehood. With the current
administration’s vocal anti-immigration and anti-Latino rhetoric,
Puerto Rico faces more barriers to entry into the union.
Puerto Rico, with its own established culture, language, and tra-
ditions, must ask itself how willing it is to integrate with the United
States.104 “[F]ederal lawmakers might resist simply because the local
population, which exceeds that of twenty-one states, would entitle
the island to a relatively large representation and to substantial
power in mainland politics.”105 Congress is then more likely to pass
the buck for as long as possible if they believe that Puerto Ricans
hold the key to political domination by the opposing party. Instead,
there needs to be a more proactive approach to explore functional
and equitable solutions, statehood or otherwise.106
To overcome the politicization of international disaster relief,
there needs to be a defined relationship between the United States
and Puerto Rico that is compatible with international practice. The
degree of control and public support in aid efforts is determinative
when allowing outside relief. Since countries look to the United
States as a global leader, it may be that political hubris prevents the
government from accepting international help—American exception-
alism must reign supreme.107 Based on the barbs traded between
(2017) (explaining that “plebiscite” refers to “a popular vote as an expression of non-
binding preference”).
101. Id. at 15 (showing that 97.2% of ballots were in favor of statehood, 1.5% for
independence/free association, and 1.3% for the current territorial status).
102. See generally id.
103. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 98, at 231–32.
104. See Ángel R. Oquendó, At Rock Bottom: Puerto Rico’s Crises and Self-Determination,
41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE (HARBINGER) 253, 261 (2017).
105. Id. at 260 n.31; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE
RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO:
APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2018 (last visited Mar. 22, 2020) (containing relevant state
population data).
106. See Oquendó, supra note 104, at 263.
107. But see Sandesh Sivakumaran, Arbitrary Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian
Assistance in Situations of Disaster, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 501, 502 (2015) (“Even the
wealthiest of States might have difficulties meeting the needs of affected persons; the
response of the United States to hurricane Katrina being a case in point.”).
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President Trump and the Puerto Rican government, it seems obvi-
ous that “[a]id refusal, much like aid provision, is at its core a politi-
cal act.”108
III. FALTERING ECONOMICS AND THE FEAR OF DEBT
The main drawback of fully incorporating Puerto Rico into the
union is the looming burden of its large debt.109 However, it is easy to
argue that the symptoms of Puerto Rico’s economic failures rest
solely with the United States’ own economic trends. Around the same
time the Insular Cases were decided, Congress also passed the Jones
Act, “which significantly raises the cost of imported goods to the
island by limiting foreign ships from going to Puerto Rico.”110 The
idea was to encourage more American-built vessels and crews to
make shipments to the island, but it severely limited any ability
Puerto Rico had to negotiate with multinational corporations and
industries.111 Puerto Rico was given a roadblock to entry into the
global market, and its economy never quite adjusted to the status
quo.112 The economic concerns of a hundred years ago linger today.
The 2008 recession incapacitated Puerto Rico’s economy, to the
point where the only real option was to look towards high interest
municipal bonds so as to avoid bankruptcy.113 “[N]o state-level eco-
nomic crises since the Great Depression has reached a point at which
rescue aid was critical to the state’s very survival as a going con-
cern.”114 Coming from the financial crisis of the last decade, Puerto
Rico was indeed on a “financial precipice.”115
108. Travis Nelson, Rejecting the Gift Horse: International Politics of Disaster Aid
Refusal, 10 CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEV. 379, 395 (2010).
109. Holly Yan, From a Debt Crisis to Hurricane Maria to a Massive Texting Scandal:
Why Puerto Rico is in Chaos, CNN (July 24, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/18/us
/puerto-rico-crises-q-and-a-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/2VX9-34B6].
110. Nicole Acevedo, Does Congress Hold Power Over Puerto Rico Through Racist,
Outdated Rulings? Lawmakers Say Yes, NBC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2019, 1:23 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/does-congress-hold-power-over-puerto-rico-through-racist
-outdated-n1071056 [https://perma.cc/A8GJ-JXLK].
111. See id.; Niraj Chokshi, Would Repealing the Jones Act Help Puerto Rico?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/us/jones-act-puerto-rico.html
[https://perma.cc/276J-ZV5Y].
112. See BRYAN RILEY, TRADE AND PROSPERITY IN THE STATES: THE CASE OF ALABAMA
(2017).
113. See Cheryl D. Block, Federal Policy for Financially-Distressed Subnational
Governments: The U.S. States and Puerto Rico, 53 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 219–20
(2017); Mitu Gulati & Robert K. Rasmussen, Puerto Rico and the Netherworld of
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 135 (2017).
114. Block, supra note 113, at 217.
115. Id.
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Puerto Rican economics have always been catered to enhance
the mainland U.S. economy. The U.S. created a dependent economy
on the island, beholden to U.S. policies in order to develop its own
infrastructure.116 “[I]n the modern age of neocolonialism, states have
used less formal, but nonetheless invasive, mechanisms to gain in-
fluence over target nations’ cultural, economic, and legal affairs.”117
Thus, Puerto Rico’s current instability can be traced back to these
foundational decisions that hindered independent development. The
island never learned how to become self-sufficient because it was
never given the circumstances to succeed on its own. Further at-
tempts at tax reform imitated history, where the government used
its “coercive power, rather than democratic deliberation” to enhance
its economic interests.118
Hurricane Maria only exacerbated the issue, making it expo-
nentially more difficult to recover. In its aftermath, citizens are
emigrating in droves, and many businesses have not reopened due
to irreparable damage to their stores.119 To combat this, “Congress
could enact disaster relief sufficient to allow Puerto Rico to rebuild
its economy.”120 That carrot came with a large stick, when Congress
“provided a glimmer of hope to the American citizens of Puerto Rico”
with implementation of PROMESA—the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act.121
Puerto Rico gained two options that it lacked prior to the legisla-
tion’s passage. But the price for these protections was steep. A
control board was put in place that effectively took over control
of the territory’s finances and the conduct of any insolvency pro-
ceedings. The members of this board were appointed by elected
officials in Washington. The elected government of Puerto Rico
had no right to appoint or veto any members. Given potential
constitutional infirmities with the control board, it remains to be
seen whether this last-minute action is sufficient to save the
island from total financial collapse.122
116. Diane Lourdes Dick, U.S. Tax Imperialism in Puerto Rico, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 13
(2015) (describing the concept of tax imperialism).
117. Id. at 12.
118. Id. at 51.
119. See Matthew Goldstein, Puerto Rico’s Positive Business Slogans Can’t Keep the
Lights On, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/puer
to-rico-business-maria.html [https://perma.cc/LF5K-P5AS]; Sutter, supra note 55.
120. Gulati & Rasmussen, supra note 113, at 138 n.23.
121. Id. at 134. See generally Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Sta-
bility Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) [hereinafter PROMESA].
122. Gulati & Rasmussen, supra note 113, at 134.
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Through this act, Puerto Rico gained a lifeline, but lost even more
of its autonomy. Under PROMESA, Congress established a Financial
Oversight and Management Board (FOMB), which carried fundamen-
tal economic decision-making power.123 “Even though the law allows
the FOMB, Congress, and the Governor to coordinate with an eye to
consensus in the enactment of the fiscal plan, the FOMB has final
authority to establish the fiscal plan and local budgets.”124 PROMESA
unequivocally seizes power from the Puerto Rican government, hold-
ing it financially hostage until the FOMB decides to allow the ter-
ritory to re-enter capital markets.125
The effects of PROMESA are yet to bear fruit, but the toll of the
hurricane has led to a disastrous 8% drop in real GDP.126 That makes
Puerto Rico the slowest growing economy in the world, far below the
troubled nations that might immediately come to American’s minds.127
The United States does have legitimate public policy concerns re-
garding Puerto Rico’s failing economy, as blowback could affect larger
national markets.128 However, the argument is that PROMESA
actually shows a Congressional intent “to intervene more exten-
sively in Puerto Rico’s internal matters.”129 As this Note shows, the
United States has a more unilateral relationship with Puerto Rico,
seemingly involving itself only in matters that have greater national
implications.130 PROMESA does not allow for more collaborative
processes, halting the territorial government from making important
financial decisions.131
Without any initiative to ensure refugees and other citizens
return to the island, these people have no incentive to ever return.
Reports indicate that Puerto Rico has lost 5% of its population in
emigration, with an estimated 250,000 more to leave by 2020.132 In
123. Colón, supra note 65, at 614.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 598–99 (quoting PROMESA § 101) (“On June 30, 2016, using the territorial
power to address a serious fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico, Congress established a Financial
Oversight and Management Board (FOMB) ‘to provide a method for [Puerto Rico] to
achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.’ ”).
126. Ana Campoy, Puerto Rico is Set to Become the World’s Worst Economy Next Year,
QUARTZ (Nov. 23, 2017), https://qz.com/1137351/hurricane-marias-impact-on-puerto-ri
cos-economy-and-jobs [https://perma.cc/J9RK-LLD9].
127. Id.
128. See James Spiotto, Puerto Rico’s Financial Woes Are Hurting US Infrastructure,
CNN (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/29/perspectives/puerto-rico-munici
pal-bonds/index.html [https://perma.cc/2DPG-56WH].
129. Colón, supra note 65, at 615.
130. See id. at 589, 593, 612–15.
131. Id. at 614.
132. Lizette Alvarez, Despair and Anger as Puerto Ricans Cope With Debt Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/04/us/despair-and-anger-as-puerto
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effect, they are gaining rights by remaining in a fully integrated state,
where their votes matter and their voices may actually be heard.133
Unfortunately, the current political turmoil in Puerto Rico does
little to further its arguments for more autonomy. In July 2019,
Governor Ricardo Rossello announced his resignation following two
concurrent scandals.134 In one, two former aides resigned after they
were caught involved in a fraudulent scheme involving federal
funds.135 The other scandal pertained to the publication of a trove of
secret messages passed between members of his administration.136
The messages crudely “mocked [Rosello’s] political foes and allies
alike,” and also seemed to implicate the Governor in misappropriat-
ing some of the reconstruction funds.137 The texts belittled members
of his own party, other Puerto Rican activists, and even made light
of the “dead bodies accumulating during and after the hurricane at
the understaffed morgue.”138 The Puerto Rican Bar Association
released a report suggesting that “seven potential crimes had been
revealed in the chat, including an implied threat against the mayor
of San Juan, . . . possible instances of diversion of funds, conspiracy,
disclosure of private information and intention to terminate employ-
ment based on political beliefs.”139
News outlets did point out that some of the vitriol was directed
towards the financial oversight board, which has curtailed the terri-
torial government’s ability to grant funding.140 But the rhetoric and
callousness of the comments left little accountability on the part of
Rosello himself. Weeks of grassroots protest clamored for his resig-
nation, as the natives saw this as the culmination of years of inepti-
tude.141 The anger over this scandal “united Puerto Ricans of all
stripes,” marking a surprising turn of events and signaling hope for
-ricans-cope-with-debt-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/DU8D-XWJ3] (“Over the past decade,
Puerto Rico has lost more than 5 percent of its population, which now numbers 3.6
million . . . An additional 250,000 people are expected to leave by 2020 . . . .”).
133. See Oquendó, supra note 104, at 262 (describing Puerto Ricans as “voting with
their feet”).
134. Patricia Mazzei & Frances Robles, Ricardo Rosselló, Puerto Rico’s Governor,
Resigns After Protests, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24
/us/rossello-puerto-rico-governor-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/8X24-XJC6].
135. Id. See also King, supra note 49.
136. Mazzei & Robles, supra note 134.
137. See id.; Patricia Mazzei, Puerto Rico Leadership in Turmoil Amid Calls for Ricardo
Rosselló to Resign, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/us
/puerto-rico-rossello.html [https://perma.cc/DG4P-RYFG].
138. Mazzei, supra note 137; see also Mazzei & Robles, supra note 134 (“Don’t we have
some cadavers to feed our crows?”).
139. Mazzei & Robles, supra note 134.
140. Mazzei, supra note 137.
141. Mazzei & Robles, supra note 134.
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a more united approach to governing the island.142 However, this
has also diminished Congress’s faith in the territory, making it “less
likely to disburse important federal aid . . . .”143
With Puerto Rico’s murky status, it does not have the agency to
create its own remedy and is at the mercy of the whims of Congress.
A recent case before the Supreme Court sought to resolve the issue
of debt redressability, which highlighted how boxed in the Puerto
Rican people are.144 Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust held
that Puerto Rico did not have the ability to enact its own municipal
bankruptcy scheme to restructure its insolvent public utilities com-
panies.145 Under the Bankruptcy Code, Puerto Rico is still a State
for many of its provisions, but is excluded from a significant subsec-
tion regarding the definition of “who may be a debtor.”146 Thus, it
cannot then authorize its “municipalities to seek relief under Chapter
9 before the municipalities may file a Chapter 9 petition,” leaving the
utility companies at the behest of lenders.147
In the dissent, Justice Sotomayor, who is Nuyorican, vehemently
denounced the decision, saying it crippled Puerto Rico’s autonomy.148
The Bankruptcy Code preempted Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act, leaving
no state avenue of recovery.149 “[A] nonfederal bankruptcy solution
is not merely a parallel option; it is the only existing legal option for
Puerto Rico to restructure debts that could cripple its citizens.”150
Torruella calls this language “double speak . . . to the effect that
although Puerto Rico belongs to the United States, it was ‘foreign in
a domestic sense.’ ”151 When convenient to the nation, Puerto Rico
shifts from an oppressed territory to a celebrated ‘state’ and people.
Justice Sotomayor was also concerned by the lack of compassion
for Puerto Rico and its citizens, where a private debtor can take the
island hostage, and the ransom is total repayment.
These concerns are starkly presented in the context of municipal
entities like public utilities. While a business corporation can
use bankruptcy to reorganize, and, if that fails, fold up shop and
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016).
145. Id. at 1942, 1949.
146. Id. at 1942.
147. Id. at 1944.
148. Id. at 1949. Justice Sotomayor also joined the dissent in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez
Valle. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2016).
149. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1950.
150. Id. at 1949 (emphasis added).
151. Torruella, supra note 57, at 89 (quoting Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341–42
(1901)).
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liquidate all of its assets, governments cannot shut down power
plants, water, hospitals, sewers, and trains and leave citizens to
fend for themselves. A “fresh start” can help not only the unfor-
tunate individual debtor but also—and perhaps especially—the
unfortunate municipality and its people.152
Once the hurricane landed, FEMA experienced first hand the
structural deficiencies in Puerto Rico’s electrical grid. “Power is the
backbone of America’s economic sectors, generating the energy that
empowers its people and businesses. The lifelines of communications,
health and medical, food and water, wastewater, and transportation
all represent critical downstream dependencies of power.”153 In its re-
port, FEMA called for a coordinated local, federal, and private sector
effort into investing in reliable, resilient, and secure infrastructure.154
What is interesting is the call for private funding, which is in
a similar vein to the solution of international aid. The reason pri-
vate investment in Puerto Rico is lacking is again due to the lack of
viable business opportunity on the island.155 Furthermore, private
businesses are not usually so altruistic as to provide aid without
furthering their own interests.
President Trump’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act also serves to limit
investment opportunities for private corporations.156 “The tax reform
imposes a new 12.5% tax on income generated from intellectual
property held by foreign corporations”—but corporations in Puerto
Rico are now defined as “foreign corporations, even when such a cor-
poration is affiliated with a mainland company . . . .”157 The economic
consequences are still unknown, but they do not make Puerto Rico
look like an enticing venture at a time when the island is desperate for
new business.
IV. PUERTO RICO IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
During the period of decolonization in the 1950s, the interna-
tional community was deliberating how to properly serve the needs
of these fledgling states without aggravating their former colonial
152. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1950.
153. FEMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 37.
154. Id. at iii.
155. Richard Levick, Private Sector Must Step Up to Spur Puerto Rico’s Recovery and
Growth, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2019, 9:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick
/2019/09/16/private-sector-must-step-up-to-spur-puerto-ricos-recovery-and-growth/#1d2d
cf9267dd [https://perma.cc/7SU3-9FJC].
156. Torruella, supra note 57, at 96–97.
157. Id. at 97.
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overlords.158 The most important factor was to determine if the state
was on a path to full independence, or if there was a continuing as-
sociation with its former colonial power.159 It was here that the United
Nations failed Puerto Rico, when it declassified the island as a Non-
Self-Governing Territory.160 In 1961, the U.N. created the Committee
on Decolonization with the express purpose of providing all people
the “right to self-determination.”161
Here is where Puerto Rico’s fate was sealed, and what the last
sixty years have been trying to correct. In November 1953, the U.S.
Representative to the U.N. General Assembly said: “I am authorized
to say on behalf of the President that, if at any time the Legislative
Assembly of Puerto Rico adopts a resolution in favor of more complete
or even absolute independence, he will immediately thereafter recom-
mend to Congress that such independence be granted.”162 However,
the sentiment of this statement does not match up with the actions
Ambassador Lodge took to ensure that the U.S. could put up a believ-
able façade of decolonization.163 By indicating that PR was capable
of full self-government, the perception of it as a dependent colony
was lessened. The declassification was met with great skepticism,
and the vote emphasized the uncertainty of the international body.164
Recently, the United Nations Special Committee on Decoloniza-
tion convened to reconsider Puerto Rico’s status, and to possibly
reinstitute is as a Non-Self-Governing Territory.165 More than fifty
petitioners, from Puerto Rican advocacy groups to international
allies, have called on the committee to fulfill its mission and find an
equitable solution to provide Puerto Ricans with the ability of self-
determination.166 The U.N. has passed thirty-seven resolutions calling
158. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1658.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1664.
161. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, ¶ 2 (Dec. 14, 1960); G.A. Res. 1654 (XVI), The Situation With Re-
gard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (Nov. 27, 1961).
162. PUBLIC SERVICES DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BULLETIN NO. 755, U.S. RELATION-
SHIP WITH PUERTO RICO: STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 841 (1953).
163. See H.R. Rep. No. 110-597, at 7 (2008).
164. The vote was hotly debated, with 20 votes for, 16 against, and 18 abstentions. See
id.; Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1664; General Assembly—Quick Links:
Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly at its 8th Session, UNITED NATIONS, https://
research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/8 [https://perma.cc/9RHA-8GNA] (last visited
Mar. 22, 2020); see also G.A. Res. 748 (VIII) (Nov. 27, 1953).
165. Press Release, Speakers Voice Concern about Environmental, Fiscal Challenges
of Puerto Rico as Special Decolonization Committee Approves Annual Self-determination
Text, U.N. Press Release GA/COL/3337 (June 24, 2019), available at https://www.un.org
/press/en/2019/gacol3337.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/F9JP-53BA].
166. Id.
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for the self-determination of Puerto Rico since its declassification in
1953, yet this seems to be the limit of its influence over the terri-
tory’s political process.167
A. Can Puerto Rico Accept International Aid Independently?
1. International Natural Disaster Response Law
Due to the encroaching nature of international aid missions, there
is a lack of cohesion in international disaster relief law (IDRL). “[A]ll
previous efforts at formulating general, universal, binding rules
have failed.”168 The main apprehension preventing any such agree-
ment from taking place is that the international relief committee
would usurp the sovereign’s power.169 In 1984, a proposed UN con-
vention on expediting international relief delivery failed to garner
adequate support, and the UN Economic and Social Council never
took action upon it.170 Any clash between state sovereignty and in-
ternational overreach led to a stalemate.171 The success of any future
multilateral convention will depend on whether the Council can
balance these two positions and appeal to the greater human rights
need at hand.172
More recent attempts at establishing universal standards of
disaster relief have come from more decentralized efforts. The Inter-
national Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)173
first created its IDRL program in 2001.174 In its Desk Study regarding
the state of the law, the IFRC noted the patched nature that devel-
oped through treaties and other soft-law agreements that, while not
167. See UN Decolonization Plans Report on Puerto Rico, PUERTO RICO REPORT (June 22,
2019), https://www.puertoricoreport.com/un-decolonization-plans-report-on-puerto-rico/#
.Xc8IpJNKjOQ [https://perma.cc/2F32-FFKE].
168. J. Benton Heath, Note, Disasters, Relief, and Neglect: The Duty to Accept Humani-
tarian Assistance and the Work of the International Law Commission, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 419, 444 (2011).
169. Id. at 444 n.92.
170. Id. (stating “[d]espite the fact that this convention provided useful measures to
speed the delivery of aid and equipment, it was opposed by some states who thought it
went too far beyond existing agreements . . . On the other side, the Red Cross organi-
zations argued that the convention over-emphasized sovereignty and the control of the
affected State”).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. For a more in-depth analysis of the IFRC’s operations and place within interna-
tional law, see Kristen Dale, Note, The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Power
Players in International and Domestic Natural Disaster Law, 25 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 111, 113–15 (2016).
174. DAVID FISHER, LAW AND LEGAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE: A
DESK STUDY 19 (2007).
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binding, “nevertheless exercise varying levels of moral authority as
evidence of international consensus and/or best practice.”175 Further
collaboration between IFRC and the UN has also had no real binding
standard of relief law, only just a general encouragement to adopt
and operationalize the IFRC’s IDRL guidelines.176
There is an accepted practice of aiding other sovereigns in the
wake of large-scale natural disasters.177 However, this has not turned
into any international custom or legally binding duty. Much of the
problems with providing aid stem from the State’s fear that the in-
ternational community will infringe upon sovereignty.178 The fear of
showing political weakness or incompetence is a powerful force oppos-
ing any international intervention. Previous debate surrounding this
issue centered on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, first
expounded in 2001 and endorsed by all UN member states at the
2005 World Summit.179 This was an important step towards better
international cooperation, but the doctrine conspicuously failed to
include one major aspect of international aid in its text: response to
natural disasters.180
175. Id. at 33.
176. IDRL Guidelines, INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOC’YS, http://www
.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines [https://perma.cc/YS7B-ZYST] (last visited
Mar. 22, 2020) (“[S]tate parties to the Geneva Conventions and the International Red
Cross Red Crescent Movement unanimously adopted the ‘Guidelines for the domestic facil-
itation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance’ (also
known as the ‘IDRL Guidelines’) at the 30th International Conference of the Movement.”);
see also G.A. Res. 69/243, at 8 (Dec. 23, 2014) (“[The General Assembly] [w]elcomes the
growing number of initiatives undertaken at the regional and national levels to promote
the implementation of the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of
International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance [IDRL Guidelines], en-
courages Member States and, where applicable, regional organizations to take further
steps to review and strengthen operational and legal frameworks for international disaster
relief, taking into account the Guidelines, as appropriate, and welcomes the valuable
support that national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies are providing to their Gov-
ernments in this area . . . .”).
177. Tyra Ruth Saechao, Note, Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to Protect:
From Chaos to Clarity, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 663, 665 (2007).
178. See id. at 685.
179. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, art. 1 (Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter
2005 World Summit Outcome]; ICISS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY VIII (2001),
http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/iciss_report.pdf [hereinafter THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT]; see, e.g., Matias Thomsen, The Obligation Not to Arbitrarily Refuse Inter-
national Disaster Relief: A Question of Sovereignty, 16 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2015)
(citing Myanmar’s refusal of international aid in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008
as a backdrop for advancing a concrete form of international humanitarian relief law);
Jarrod Wong, Reconstructing the Responsibility to Protect in the Wake of Cyclones and
Separatism, 84 TUL. L. REV. 219, 219 (2009); Jessica Lucia Frattaroli, Note, A State’s Duty
to Prepare, Warn, and Mitigate Natural Disaster Damages, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
173, 187 (2014).
180. See Wong, supra note 179, at 219.
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Responsibility to Protect holds that “where sovereign govern-
ments are manifestly failing to discharge their primary responsibility
to protect their populations from ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleans-
ing and crimes against humanity,’ that responsibility shifts to the
wider international community acting through the United Nations.”181
R2P encompasses three principles: the responsibility to react, respon-
sibility to prevent, and responsibility to rebuild.182 The Commission
constantly refers to the need to respect state sovereignty, and so it
recognizes few cases in which international intervention is necessary
and has “just cause.”183 This Note focuses on its first set of just cause
circumstances, namely in order to prevent “large scale loss of life,
actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability
to act, or a failed state situation[.]”184
It is evident that the main focus of R2P is to intervene in serious
ongoing conflicts, but the report carves out an inclusion for “over-
whelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state
concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance,
and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened.”185 In the broad
conditions set out, “large-scale” is the term that rules whether inter-
vention is justified.186 The ICISS report does not attempt to quantify
the term, and thus the debate on where to draw the line can com-
pletely takeover any other consideration when trying to justify inter-
national humanitarian relief. As mentioned earlier, the Puerto Rican
government estimates the death toll at 2,975.187 While significant,
this number pales in comparison to the tragedies that spurred the
establishment of international intervention procedures.188 Focus on
intervention in international and non-international armed conflicts
presumes to trump any ‘lesser’ type of disaster, where arms are not
involved but the casualties can still reach the same level.
181. Id. at 221 (quoting 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 179).
182. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 179, at XI.
183. Id. at 32.
184. Id. (emphasis omitted).
185. Id. at 33.
186. Id.
187. Puerto Rico Increases Hurricane Maria Death Toll to 2,975, BBC (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45338080 [https://perma.cc/38JG-BS5W].
188. The R2P report points to the conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia as
the catalysts for greater analysis on the issues of intervention. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT, supra note 179, at 1 (“These four cases occurred at a time when there were
heightened expectations for effective collective action following the end of the Cold War.
All four of them . . . have had a profound effect on how the problem of intervention is
viewed, analyzed and characterized.”).
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Of course, applicability of the R2P doctrine remains unclear. It
is up to the Security Council to make such decisions.189 With China
and Russia’s aversions to outside interference, it is unlikely that any
such resolution would pass, so the precedent of human rights trump-
ing state sovereignty could not take hold.190 Furthermore, when the
UN endorsed the R2P doctrine, it limited its scope and did not fully
codify all of the ICISS report’s propositions, notably omitting any ref-
erence to natural disaster relief.191 Critics rely on this fact, regarding
the omission as a “deliberate rejection by the United Nations of the
applicability of R2P to natural disasters, asserting that its use here
is accordingly improper and further will only encourage reliance on
the doctrine to justify all manner of humanitarian interventions.”192
B. The United States’ Obligations Under International Law
As such, the United States has no binding legal norms over its
stance on international disaster relief. “More specifically still, there
is no legal obligation (leaving aside the question of moral obligation)
incumbent upon the United States to refrain from interfering with
the provision of humanitarian relief in disaster situations.”193 In its
capacity as sovereign, the United States has wide discretion over how
relief fund is distribution and how aid is limited. Congress’s initial
allocation of $4.9 billion covered just a fraction of the estimated
damages, cited between $45 and $90 billion.194
The United Nations has always maintained its position on the
status of Puerto Rico since the initial resolution in 1953.195 In its
resolution, the General Assembly recognized that “the people of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have been invested with attributes
of political sovereignty which clearly identify the status of self-govern-
ment attained by the Puerto Rican people as that of an autonomous
189. Id. at 50.
190. See Thomsen, supra note 179, at 17 (noting that China and Russia immediately
rejected the proposal to invoke R2P doctrine in the wake of Myanmar’s abject response
to the damage caused by Cyclone Nargis).
191. Wong, supra note 179, at 231 (quoting 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note
179, ¶¶ 138–39).
192. Id. at 245.
193. Justin A. Fraterman, Criminalizing Humanitarian Relief: Are U.S. Material Sup-
port for Terrorism Laws Compatible with International Humanitarian Law?, 46 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 399, 450 (2014) (discussing the interference of material support law hin-
dering efforts to provide humanitarian relief to conflict and non-conflict disaster zones).
194. See Special Comm. on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Indep. to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Special Comm.
decision of 19 June 2017 concerning Puerto Rico, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2018/L.13
(Feb. 12, 2018).
195. See G.A. Res. 748 (VIII), supra note 164.
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political entity . . . .”196 With this quasi-foreign status achieved, the
U.S. government exercised control over Puerto Rican affairs with
impunity and disregard for the will of the Puerto Rican people.197
Federalist arguments also seem to support territorial autonomy,
where a state or territory government—closer to the people—are bet-
ter equipped to handle local issues than a federal government that is
less active in the area.198 In a federalized nation, the subunits of the
central government are more “visible to outside nations in a way that
the fully subordinated divisions of a unitary state are not.”199 There
is a larger focus on autonomy and the right of self-determination,
where the state has a greater duty to its citizens than to the federal
government.200 Simply standing by as a country continues to belittle
the plight of its people only furthers oppression; that said, “states
that fail to protect their own people from mass atrocities [should]
lose their right to territorial integrity.”201 This does not condone any
invasion or infringement upon American sovereignty, but asks for
the international community to hold the United States government
more accountable to its inherent moral and political obligations.
The United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization has
continued to monitor the situation in Puerto Rico, and has recently
stepped up its rhetoric on the worrying conditions in the territory.202
With the increased call of a change in the status quo by the Puerto
Rican people in their multiple plebiscites, it is clear that Puerto Rico’s
feelings on its relationship has drastically changed in the sixty years
since the initial declaration. Much of the international community
has called for action in accordance with Resolution 748(VIII), noting
that “either of the parties to the mutually agreed association may
desire any change in the terms of this association.”203
In particular, the Committee has noticed the recent legislation
regarding Puerto Rico: the PROMESA bill and the case Puerto Rico
196. Id. ¶ 5.
197. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 110-597 (2008).
198. See Edward L. Rubin, The Role of Federalism in International Law, 40 B.C. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 195, 208 (2017) (“The federalist character of a nation—that is, the degree
to which the nation grants autonomy to its subsidiary units—might well change what con-
stitutes an internal affair and thereby change another nation’s willingness to intervene.”).
199. Id.
200. Id.; see Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE
L.J. 797, 812–13 (2017).
201. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 200, at 813.
202. See Special Comm. on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Indep. to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Decision of the
Special Comm. of 20 June 2016 concerning Puerto Rico, ¶¶ 1, 4, 8–9, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109
/2017/L.12 (June 16, 2017).
203. G.A. Res. 748 (VIII), supra note 164, ¶ 9.
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v. Sanchez Valle.204 The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries stated
concern at the “imposition of a financial oversight board on the Gov-
ernment of Puerto Rico, which would encroach upon its already limited
power over its budget.”205 PROMESA, as noted earlier, constricts the
already limited power of the Puerto Rican government and “points
to an intensification of colonial control over Puerto Rico.”206 The
establishment of the FOMB epitomized the blatant restriction of
self-determination.207
The Board, “whose authority supersedes that of the laws adopted
by the legislature of Puerto Rico” effectively removed any opportunity
for self-determination from the island.208 The committee denounced
the implementation of the FOMB as a violation of Puerto Rico’s right
to self-determination, and it implored the United States to “expedite
a process that would allow the people of Puerto Rico to exercise fully
their right to self-determination and independence. . . . to take deci-
sions in a sovereign manner, and to address their urgent economic and
social needs, including unemployment, marginalization, insolvency
and poverty.”209 So far, PROMESA has not shown significant progress
in improving the island’s financial situation.210 Even with its power,
at the time of the Board’s report in early 2018, Puerto Rico did not
have access to the municipal bonds market due to its credit rating.211
In July 2019, the Special Committee on Decolonization approved
its resolution on the Puerto Rico situation, calling on the United
States to promote a “process that enables Puerto Ricans to fully ex-
ercise their right to self-determination and independence, and to
take decisions in a sovereign manner to address their challenges.”212
The committee also noted its concern that, with the implementation
204. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2018/L.13, supra note 194, ¶ 36.
205. Special Comm. on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Dec-
laration on the Granting of Indep. to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Summary record
of the 6th meeting, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2017/SR.6 (July 21, 2017) (noting “[t]he
political subordination of the Puerto Rican people impeded their sovereign capacity to
take decisions to address their economic and social problems, including the current fiscal
crisis, the insolvency of the Government and the need to restructure the public debt”).
206. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2018/L.13, supra note 194, ¶ 43.
207. Id. ¶ 36 (citing The Board’s mandate to “ensure that Puerto Rico has a balanced
budget and has access to the capital markets for four consecutive years before its mandate
would cease”).
208. See id.
209. Press Release, Special Comm. on Decolonization, Special Committee on Decoloni-
zation Approves Text Calling Upon United States Government to Expedite Self-Determina-
tion Process for Puerto Rico, U.N. Press Release GA/COL/3926 (June 20, 2016), available
at https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/gacol3296.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/EYQ3-MLEU];
see also Colón, supra note 65, at 615–16.
210. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2018/L.13, supra note 194, ¶¶ 52, 74–76, 83.
211. Id. ¶ 36.
212. See U.N. Press Release GA/COL/3337, supra note 165.
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of PROMESA, “the already weakened area in which the prevailing
regime of political and economic subordination in Puerto Rico operates
is reduced” even further, stripping the government of any agency.213
This was the same draft resolution written the year before, however,
again underlining the limits of the Special Committee’s ability to
instill change.214
By calling the situation a “humanitarian crisis in America,”
Puerto Rico hopes to elevate the disaster into the conversation of
failed humanitarian relief.215 San Juan Mayor Carmen Yulin Cruz
described the situation more bluntly: “We are dying here. If we don’t
get the food and the water into the people’s hands, we are going to
see something close to a genocide.”216
V. THE SOLUTION
With Puerto Rico’s stability in question, the international commu-
nity has a duty to step up and reassess the situation. There needs to
be comprehensive and open reform, requiring international coopera-
tion and a willingness from Congress to shift the conversation on
Puerto Rican sovereignty. Reconstruction needs not just better
humanitarian aid, but also economic recovery dedicated to Puerto
Rican interests.
The most reasonable step towards a solution is to reclassify
Puerto Rico as a non-self-governing territory. That way, the UN
Special Committee on Decolonization can again report on whether
Puerto Rico’s autonomy is enough to not be considered a colony. Any
report on Puerto Rico would have great effect in renewing the dis-
course surrounding the island. Among the factors considered should
be that Puerto Rico “currently spends more money servicing its debt
than it does funding education or health, that at least 150 public
schools have closed, and that approximately 3000 doctors have emi-
grated, statistics that amount to a humanitarian crisis.”217 As men-
tioned before, the law of self-determination necessitates a setting
where citizens have more than partial liberty—that “peoples have
213. Id.
214. See id.; see also Special Comm. on the Situation with regard to the Implementa-
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of Indep. to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
Decision of the Special Comm. of 18 June 2018 concerning Puerto Rico, ¶¶ 2, 8–10, U.N.
DOC. A/AC.109/2019/L.7 (June 19, 2019).
215. Deirdre Walsh & Kevin Liptak, Federal Response to Hurricane Maria Slowly
Takes Shape, CNN (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/25/politics/puerto-rico
-hurricane-maria-aid-donald-trump/index.html [https://perma.cc/5YKH-K7LM].
216. Meyer, supra note 11.
217. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1673 (emphasis added).
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the right to ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.’ ”218
Recently, Congress has shifted more focus to the crisis in Puerto
Rico, especially after the natural disasters placed the spotlight di-
rectly on the territory.219 A bipartisan House resolution was intro-
duced that would reject the Insular Cases and “their use as legal
precedent for current and future rulings on Puerto Rico or the other
U.S. territories.”220 These cases have notoriously been linked to
Plessy v. Ferguson,221 as they were written by the same Justices.
They espouse parallel decisions about diminishing the role of racial
minorities in civic society. It took sixty years for Plessy to be over-
turned.222 Congress can do even more, by repealing the Jones Act,
and allowing Puerto Rico to build an independent economic pathway
to wealth.
Right now, Puerto Ricans have the illusion of internal self-
determination. Although they carry U.S. citizenship, their inability
to vote or to participate substantively in the political process consti-
tutes a denial of fundamental liberty.223 By highlighting the defi-
ciencies of Puerto Rican citizenship compared to mainland U.S.
citizenship, Puerto Rico’s government can build its case for secession
or another form of greater autonomy and independence.224 In its
latest resolution, the Special Committee on Decolonization called on
the General Assembly to “comprehensively consider the question of
Puerto Rico and decide on the issue as soon as possible.”225
Puerto Rico may seek to follow the template set out in the after-
math of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In a similar situation, the New
Orleans area was devastated by the hurricane, and the government’s
obvious lack of preparation and foresight led to a colossal loss of life,
218. Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and Internal Self-Determination:
A Right of Newly Seceded Peoples to Democracy?, 34 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 1, 4
(2017) (quoting G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, art. 2 (Dec. 14, 1960)).
219. Nicole Acevedo, House Delegation’s Immediate Priority in Puerto Rico Doesn’t
Include Statehood, NBC NEWS (March 18, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino
/house-delegation-s-immediate-priority-puerto-rico-doesn-t-include-n984571 [https://
perma.cc/X52S-ZCWA].
220. Acevedo, supra note 110.
221. 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see id.
222. Acevedo, supra note 110.
223. See Anderson, supra note 218, at 25; Alexia Fernández Campbell, Puerto Rico’s
Push for Statehood Explained, VOX (Sept. 24, 2018, 3:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy
-and-politics/2018/1/11/15782544/puerto-rico-pushes-for-statehood-explained [https://perma
.cc/A2LJ-W8BH].
224. See Anderson, supra note 218, at 23, 62 (calling this form “external self-
determination”).
225. U.N. Press Release GA/COL/3337, supra note 165.
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much of which may have been preventable.226 In its report investi-
gating the response to Hurricane Katrina, the government summa-
rized as follows:
Hurricane Katrina necessitated a national response that [f]ederal,
[s]tate, and local officials were unprepared to provide . . . The
[f]ederal response suffered from significant organization and
coordination problems during this week of crisis. The lack of
communications and situational awareness had a debilitating
effect on the [f]ederal response. Even after coordinating elements
were in place, [f]ederal departments and agencies continued to
have difficulty adapting their standard procedures to this cata-
strophic incident. The [f]ederal government’s problems respond-
ing to Hurricane Katrina illustrate greater systemic weaknesses
inherent in our current national preparedness system: the lack
of expertise in the areas of response, recovery, and reconstruction.
Insufficient planning, training, and interagency coordination are
not problems that began and ended with Hurricane Katrina. The
storm demonstrated the need for greater integration and syn-
chronization of preparedness efforts, not only throughout the
[f]ederal government, but also with the [s]tate and local govern-
ments and the private and non-profit sectors as well.227
Replace Katrina with Maria, and the response almost mirrors that
in FEMA’s After-Action Report, over twelve years later.
If such a failure in institutional preparedness can continue to
exist after multiple disasters, it shows an inability to rise to the
level of protection necessary to ensure the lives of its citizens. This
is more than a simple indifference, but a lack of resources or the
capacity to improve the “systemic weaknesses” in the current disas-
ter relief system.228
The looming concern is the certain political backlash facing any
nation or organization that tries to criticize the United States’ domes-
tic policy. Such a pragmatic and cautious view of international rela-
tions greatly ignores the people in need of assistance; “[t]he criteria
for intervening . . . depends on the scope and intensity of the victims’
suffering, not on the political structure of the subject nation.”229 Of
226. See Casinova O. Henderson, Hurricane Katrina Victims: A Claim in the Interna-
tional Courts?, FL. A&M U. L. REV. 155, 157 (2010) (“An insufficient response to a natural
disaster based on the federal government policies could be considered systematic or wide-
spread so as to constitute a crime against humanity when there is a pattern of failures.”).
227. FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA:
LESSONS LEARNED 50 (2006), available at: http://library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/ka
trinawh.pdf.
228. See id.
229. Rubin, supra note 198, at 215.
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course, with this disaster occurring on U.S. soil, the ability to bypass
the political structure is impossible. Through diplomacy and exter-
nal pressures, the international community can try to influence
action on behalf of Puerto Rico.
However, in the end there must be a bilateral decision to move
forward on forming a clear political relationship between the parties.
“[V]indication may consist in empowering Puerto Rico to rule itself”
and pursue a broader framework of autonomy.230 One of the myriads
of reasons why Puerto Ricans have failed to advance any strong push
for greater autonomy is the fear of losing the American safety net.231
Politicians need to take a stand with Puerto Rico and fully sup-
port building a coalition towards self-determination.232 Any grassroots
support against this “indefinite disenfranchisement” must come from
the greater Latin-American mainland community, who have the plat-
form to speak for the island locals.233 Some call for “a larger role for
Puerto Rico’s NGO sector to help break the logjam and deliver the
critical recovery services that communities across the island need.”234
Instead of implementing more bureaucracy, there needs to be a way
to streamline the release of already approved federal aid. Non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) may have the best pathway to
provide that relief, as they are usually more trusted by local commu-
nities.235 By breaking down to barrier of mistrust, there can be an
efficient way to “implement the projects that have the most immedi-
ate and enduring positive impact on the quality of life of the people
of Puerto Rico.”236
According to Colón, Sanchez Valle provides a pathway to explore
“asymmetric sovereign relations” due to its view of the meaning of
sovereignty.237 Congress should use “inventive statesmenship” and
230. Oquendó, supra note 104, at 254.
231. See Frances Robles, 23% of Puerto Ricans Vote in Referendum, 97% of Them for
Statehood, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11/us/puerto-ri
cans-vote-on-the-question-of-statehood.html [https://perma.cc/6X9G-77QH].
232. Contra Oquendó, supra note 104, at 258 (stating that politicians “will typically
make a generic pledge to honor the will of the local electorate and, implicitly, to avoid
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find a way to better balance the interests of both parties.238 In this
sense, the federal government has continuously failed to evolve in
accordance with the times and sentiments of its people. Contrary to
the Court’s opinion, the future does matter, and diplomacy should
always look towards a more amicable and equitable future.239
This fear is not unsubstantiated, since congressional actions
depict an aversion to the idea of Puerto Rican statehood.240 Puerto
Rico itself is still uncertain of the best path, with neither the option
of statehood nor a commonwealth gaining a majority of votes in
previous plebiscites.241 U.S. officials can then pass the buck, claim-
ing that any inaction is a result of Puerto Rico’s hesitancy. At the
same time, Congress has not tried to find a way to promote either
option, content with letting the political status remain in limbo.242
As noted earlier, the Democratic-leaning population likely puts
off any Republican administration from touching the issue.243 Due
to the prolonged inaction by any administration, Puerto Ricans may
feel so politically disenfranchised that they do not trust nor support
either party.244 Thus, an opportunity presents itself, for either side
to be proactive and pursue practical pathways towards Puerto Rican
self-determination.245 While the island may currently favor the
social welfare platform of Democrats, it is actually Republicans that
favor a federalist government, one where states and localities have
more authority over its own affairs.246 If a Republican administration
presented an appealing option for Puerto Rico’s future, it could seize
control of a huge demographic that is traditionally held by the left.247
large-scale choices about their own political institutions; and that Congress did exactly
that in enacting Public Law 600 and approving the Puerto Rico Constitution . . . .”).
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There are reasons for both sides to stop ignoring this issue and bring
about real progress.
Building the foundation for Puerto Rico to succeed as an indepen-
dent nation-state depends on proper economic reforms. The collapse
of Puerto Rico’s economy falls on both the federal and the territorial
governments.248 A good step towards recovery is allowing the island
to impose its own constraints. Having the island legislate its own in-
terests removes any mainland bias that Congress may unknowingly
bring. There needs to be more action than just forming an oversight
board. It may suggest improvements, but there is no evidence of any
active policy implementation.249
Puerto Rico itself can do better, but it needs domestic and inter-
national support to truly begin restoring its shores. Domestically,
one branch of government needs to step up and stop the continuous
neglect of Puerto Ricans. A step first is for the judiciary to overrule
its previous rulings that Puerto Rico, as a territory, is simply U.S.
“property.”250 Property connotes ownership over something;251 in this
case, the property in question is the lives and rights of Puerto Ricans.
Without self-determination, these citizens do not have the full protec-
tions guaranteed by the Founders of this country.252
CONCLUSION
Puerto Rico has “a relationship to the United States that has no
parallel in our history . . . .”253 When Hurricane Maria hit Puerto
Rican shores, it brought the island back to the national forefront.
The Hurricane not only highlighted issues in the island’s infrastruc-
ture and development, but also in the deficiencies of its relationship
with the nation as a whole. It is unfortunate that human suffering
brings greater focus to a situation, but now is the time for Puerto
Rico to grasp onto that platform and start the call for a holistic
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reconstruction effort. Millions of proud Puerto Ricans have essentially
fled their homes, living on the mainland as domestic refugees.254
These are refugees with stronger rights, however, and no reason to
return to the island besides nostalgia. As a result, Puerto Rico is leak-
ing its culture and language, losing its identity as it falls further
into crisis.
The country needs to see the aftermath of Hurricane Maria as
an opportunity for rebirth, and a chance to rekindle growth in a place
rich of culture and people. Look no further than the rebuilding of
New Orleans post–Hurricane Katrina. At almost fifteen years later,
parts of the city shine, but recovery is still incomplete.255 Across many
indicators, it is clear that New Orleans is in a better place than it was
pre-Hurricane, with a better school system and robust tourism.256
That process took time and patience, but it also showed that the
roots of the problem never truly go away. Still, some lower socioeco-
nomic classes are as vulnerable as they were before the destruc-
tion.257 Puerto Rico needs to learn from this process and find a way
to utilize aid to enforce long-term change and progress.
Puerto Rico has hope. Activists are coming to its aid, bringing
awareness and opportunity back to the island.258 By keeping the focus
on the island’s people and culture, Puerto Rico can use the momentum
to build an international platform for its needs. When the entire
world is listening, the perception of growth can then become reality.
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